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THE outstanding feature of mental disorder after head injury is loss of consciousness in some degree. I add the qualification because a good deal of confusion is apt to arise in practice about what loss of consciousness means. It is argued quite reasonably that a man who is capable of answering questions, for instance, giving his name and address after an accident, is conscious. But if next day he has no recollection of having done so, or of the period of time when the incident occurred, he may with equal reason be said to have been unconscious of what he was doing. For purposes of description in head injuries, if a man has no memory of what he has done, we assume that he was not at that time fully conscious. Therefore, the duration of unconsciousness may be measured by that of the traumatic amnesia following the accident. It is the symptoms which may be observed during this period of traumatic amnesia that I shall first discuss.
Let us consider the common case of minor injury-one of so-called concussion. The clinical picture in the moment after the accident is dominated by the physical state of complete flaccid paralysis. The mental state is that of profound stupor. From this the recovery of consciousness may be rapid, but however rapid, it is always gradual. There is a transition from deep stupor to a state of dazed bewilderment, and after this automatism, before full consciousness returns, and the amnesia will often be found to include some utterance or action which has appeared " conscious " to the bystander. The whole process of recovery may take only a few minutes. Sometimes, even though the initial deep stupor may have been ofmomentary duration, the process of recovery may be spread over a longer period. In particular is this true of the phase of automatism, as in the well-known instances of football players who play to the end of the game after an injury, with subsequent amnesia. Occasionally the loss of consciousness after injury may be delayed. The patient may then remember the accident and the events immediately following it, and after a few minutes, sometimes an hour or two, lapse into a state of automatism which lasts several hours. These are the common mental effects of minor injury.
Turning our attention now towards the other end of the scale, after an exceptionally severe injury, we may see the progress of recovery to full consciousness spread over a period of days, weeks, or even months.
Between these two extremes every gradation may be observed. The mental disorder in the one case may be dismissed as " after-effects of concussion ", or in the other, dignified by the title of " acute traumatic psychosis ", but I believe there is no essential difference between the two. The long-drawn-out cases, of course, offer the greatest opportunities for observation.
Following the classical paper of Adolf Meyer in 1904, no important study of the acute traumatic psychosis seems to have appeared in the English language until Schilder's contribution in 1934. In the interval, however, several valuable papers had appeared in Germany, notably that by Pfeiffer in 1928. My own observations are regrettably incomplete, in that they are derived from occasional cross-sections of the illness rather than from continuous records. They have been selected from the notes of 16 cases in which the acute symptoms lasted from three weeks to fourteen months.
In the course of a prolonged traumatic psychosis, a more or less regular sequence may be observed in the stages of recovery. There is at first the phase of deep stupor, with muscular relaxation. This negative state is of brief duration. Following this, Schilder distinguishes three stages:-(1) Deep clouding of consciousness, with general resistiveness.
(2) Clouding of consciousness, with disorientation, bewilderment, and helplessness.
(3) After the clouding of consciousness has subsided, a state of Korsakow's psychosis. This classification of the stages of recovery is, I think, of value, but the transition from one stage to another is gradual and subject to fluctuations. Moreover, as the greater part of the third stage is included within the period of traumatic amnesia, there is still during this stage impairment of consciousness according to the definition which I have proposed.
I prefer, therefore, to consider the traumatic psychosis as a whole, recognizing in its course the predominance, at one time or another, of certain features: In the early stages stupor, later, confusion; and, after confusion has faded into the background of the picture, defective memory for recent events with a tendency towards confabulation.
Before attempting to describe the symptoms of mental disorder in these cases of severe injury, I should like to make it clear that the material from which I shall draw comprises the notes of patients with closed injuries only. That is to say, no case has been included in which a compound fracture might have complicated the clinical picture by introducing the effects either of visible laceration of the cortex, or of infection. Even in closed injuries, however, we may encounter the clinical evidence of coarse focal lesions, for instance, hemiplegia or dysphasia. Such cases, also, I have excluded, my object being to present what appears to be the direct effect of injury upon the cerebral function as a whole.
After the initial stage of flaccid coma, there is usually a period of deep stupor, associated with restless bodily movements, such as turning over in bed, but without speech, and without any response to internal or external stimuli above the level of the simplest alimentary, excretory, or protective functions. This state of deep stupor rarely lasts more than a day or two. I have seen one case in which it persisted for no less than eighty-five days, but in this instance there was a right hemiparesis, and I think it probable that a coarse lesion of the left frontal lobe played a part in the clinical picture.
As the patient emerges from stupor he is, as a rule, excited, sometimes dazed and bewildered, and reacts in a resistive, irritable way to outside interference. He is wet and dirty and has to be fed. Often there is delirium, sometimes with an occupational trend. This state may continue for days, weeks, or even months, and there may be occasional relapse into stupor for as long as two or three days at a time.
Gradually, behaviour becomes quieter and speech more coherent, so that it is possible for short periods to engage the patient in conversation and learn something more of the mental content. The salient features at this stage are as follows: There is profound disorientation in space and time, with a tendency to interpret the surroundings in terms of past experience. There is defect of perception and inability to synthesize perceptual data. Memory and judgment are grossly impaired. Thought is constantly impeded by perseveration. Disturbance of the speech function is conspicuous. The mood is often elated and there is sometimes a push of talk resembling that seen in hypomanic states.
Ritchie Russell has drawn attention to the tendency shown by patients in this stage to give their age as much less than it really is, and to speak of long-past experiences as if they had happened quite recently. This tendency, I believe, is not uncommon. There is a far-reaching retrograde amnesia and the patient's attempts at orientation are influenced by this fact. There is also a tendency even at this stage to confabulate.
Ca8e L-As an example, I have a note on H. B., a man of 29, a motor salesman, whom I saw with Mr. Cairns at the London Hospital on the 30th day after his injury. He had been in a state of restless stupor from the first, his behaviour gradually becoming more reasonable and his speech more coherent. He was still at the time I saw him occasionally ineontinent. Sometimes he recognized his wife and sister. Outgoing speech was fair but he was unable to write intelligibly. He obeyed the spoken, but not the written, command. There were no signs of any focal lesion. The past history showed that he had gone from his preparatory school to the Royal Naval College at Pangbourne, subsequently for a short period into the Royal Naval Reserve, then into the Mercantile Marine, and for the eight years previous to his accident had been in the motor trade. He had been married five years.
The following is an extract from my note of our conversation:-"What is your name ? " "Baylis." (He spells it correctly and afterwards his Christian name, Hugh.)
"What is your age ?" "Nineteen and a half." "Is that all ? " "That's all-all so far." "You look older." "That's all I am."
"Are you sure you are not 29 ?"
"No, quite sure." "When is your birthday ?" "January 3." I ask the house surgeon what is his real age and he tells me. The patient overhears this and says: " You can't tell unless you check up. These people round here in the cabins, they should know I'm three nine twenty nine. I suppose one gets older a bit in the Navy. I suppose your life sophisticates you a bit really." "Where are you ? " "Where ? Oh ! I see what you mean. I'm in the public school semi-past Rugger stage. That's to say I play fairly well but not well enough to be one of the big noises. I'm fairly average at sports-in fact fairly good. Cricket, bad, definitely I should say-on averages." "Have you got a job ? " "Yes I'm chief cadet captain-in charge of a term. Each of us has charge of a term." "Do you earn your own living?" "Well a cadet captain earns his own living up to a certain extent." "Are you married ? " "No, I'm not married. I shall be married shortly after I leave here. I expect very shortly afterwards." "Can you drive a car ?" "Yes." "Have you got one ?" "No, except my father's car." "Where does he live ? " "Hampshire. He drives one of those old-fashioned touring cars known as the Hampton." "Who is this ? " (pointing to house surgeon).
"I don't know." "What is his job?" "Oh, a scout number one to you, to find things out in an intelligent way." "How is life generally ? " "Oh, life is grand generally. I think we're nearly at the end of the war now. I think we'll all be glad about that." " What year is it ? " "The fifth year of the war actually." "What year i8 it ?" "The thirtieth thousand year of the world, 1930th really of the . . of our . .
Following this, I spent some time over a neurological examination, examined him with tests for aphasia, and then returned to the question of his age and job. Againi he insisted that he was 19, and at Pangbourne, giving me details of the life he was leading, which were, on the whole. consistent.
The difficulties in the sphere of perception and in the synthesis of perceptual data have been very carefully described by Schilder. They play a large part in causing the confusion. So also do perseveration, distractibility, and the inability to distinguish clearly between figure and background in the thought process.
Goldstein, in describing the principal forms of disintegration of function following cerebral lesions, has emphasized the following points. In the first place, there is a rise of the threshold for excitation. In the second place, any stimulus which surmounts the raised threshold and causes excitation expands abnormally and lasts an abnormal period of time. These are in fact the phenomena of raised threshold and over-reaction with which we are familiar in partial lesions of the sensory pathway at any level. At the level of mental function they are expressed in terms of defective perception and perseveration. As a third characteristic effect of cerebral damage, the performances of the organism are unduly influenced by exterllal factors. Finally, performance is affected by a disturbance of the figure-background relationship. According to Goldstein, the essence of every mental event is the formation of a figure which stands out in relief against a background. In every thought process there is an active tendency towards such figure formation. The tendency is to select from a mass of more or less suitable material those elements which are suitable for a precise figure formation, and to reject those elements which are unsuitable. The rejected elements form the background. As the final result we have the figure standing out in relief against a background of related but irrelevant material. As the result of disease, the selective action breaks down. The formation of a precise figure then is interfered with by the emergence of loosely related material from the background. The attempt at thinking, therefore, can only result in a blurred figure formation.
These conceptions of Goldstein are, I think, helpful in the understanding of traumatic mental confusion. I shall refer to them again from time to time.
Perseveration in thought, word, and deed is certainly one of the most striking features in this stage. The following case is an example: Case II.--A man aged 67 had a fall when hunting. He was in a state of deep stupor for several days, subsequently excited and confused, but when I saw him on the 70th day after his accident he had for some time been quiet and easily managed, except at night when he was sometimes delirious. He was able to feed himself, but when he tried to shave becatne muddled. He had been up and out for short walks. There had been no incontinence for a month.
I found him alert, amiable, and ready to converse. He was comnpletely disoriented. Thought and speech at the automatic level appeared normal but anything more difficult was impeded by perseveration. For instance, he expressed a desire to urinate but said he would wait till the end of my examination. I then suggested that he might get out of bed to pass water so that I might see himn on his legs, but later altered this, asking him instead to walk across the room to the window. He did so, stood gazing out into the garden, remarked that it was a fine day, and, while still looking out of the window, in an automatic way let down his pyjamas and began to urinate on the floor.
Disturbance of the speech function in the stage of the mental disorder which we are now considering is a symptom which at once attracts the attention of the neurologist. It is at times so prominent as to suggest a focal lesion, but the dysphasia shows an improvement pari pa8sU with the general mental disorder, and it would seem that we are-dealing with a general disorder of cerebral function in which the function of speech is naturally involved. Observation and analysis of the dysphasia, therefore may, by sampling the general mental disorder at a particular point, throw some light upon its nature.
After the first return of automatic speech, there is often a considerable push of talk in which words and phrases are well formed but unrelated to one another or to the circumstances-in fact a jargon. Then the spontaneous talk begins to have some general direction, though it is for the most part meaningless. It is apt to be concerned from time to time with some habitual activity or actual experience. At this stage the patient's attention can be gained for a moment or two. He will answer questions, name objects, and read aloud, but his responses are inaccurate and often so distantly related to the question or request as to seem quite at random. The following case provides some illustrations of what may com monly be observed:
CaseIII.-A man aged 27 was found on the road after a motor accident in a state of flaccid stupor. I saw him at the end of thirty-six hours when he responded only to painful stimuli with generalized movemiients of withdrawal. His cerebrospinal fluid was clear and colourless, with a pressure of 135. Seen on the 10th day he was excitable, talkative and confused. He said "How do you do?" and "Good-bye" normally, but otherwise talked jargon continuously. When asked his age, he said " 27 " and, in reply to all subsequent questions, said "27 ". When I ceased to question him he began counting from 27 to 35. His response to spoken commiiands was uncertain.
Asked to name a box of matches, he did so correctly, but subsequently called a watch "watches ". Next shown a bunch of keys, he called it ' grey locks" and continued to give this name to all objects subsequently shown him.
On the 12th day his spontaneous talk, though still meaningless, contained frequent references to theatres and Paris. (After his recovery I found that he had been to a theatre in Paris during the week-end before the accident.) Shown aflorin, he called it a two-theatre piece but later a two-florin piece. A box of matches he called a theatre, but handled it correctly, took out a match, lit it and blew it out.
At this stage, above the automatic level, speech showed little relation to external stimuli, the streamn of thought being mainly directed by the prevailing trend of the delirium. When any response to external stimulus could be obtained it was influenced by perseveration.
On the 14th day, the spontaneous talk, still meaningless, had frequent reference to hotels.
His response to naming objects was as follows: He then continued spontaneously:-"I think I'm a great deal better in that I think I can go the whole hog.' This he repeated six times and went on:-" I think I've seen this before. I think I've seen the whole hog, and that I've been quite willing to see the whole hog. Don't you think so? Don't you think the think of the whole tell? Don't you think the way of the hotel. I should be quite willing to realize the hotel?" I again asked him to name a box of matches. He did so correctly and said: " And I think if you ask me fairly, I think that quite fairly the box of matches will be very much beyond the power of the hotel."
On the 80th day he was much improved; recognized he was in hospital, and had some idea of having had an accident. There was still, however, a great deal of confusion, and defective comprehension and perseveration made continuous conversation impossible.
On the 153rd day I saw him again. In the meantime he had been ill with a femoral thrombosis. This time he appeared to know me, gave me a cheerful greeting and said:
" I know you, you were the doctor at the last place I was at. What was that place by the way? It has some connexion with this place, hasn't it? Aren't they run by the same people ? " "My name is Symonds, Dr. Symonds." "That's right, Dr. Symonds. I always think it looks bad not to know people's names." "How are you ? " "I am very well now. I am really. I mean all my legs are perfectly intact, but these medical people won't send you out of hospital until you are ready to give the world kicks."
Later I asked him my name. "Hedley Hart. No, Hedley." "But I told you I was Dr. Symonds I" "Yes, but didn't you say it was Hart too ? No, well I'm bad there I" "What is this place ? " "Hedley,Hart I think they call it. It has been changed round a lot. It used to be another building. Do tell me your name ? "
He named pencil, watch, matches, ring, pipe, hat and gloves correctly in this order, but then called keys: "hitches, a box of hitches ", correcting it to keys when they were jingled.
His response to spoken commands was good if they were not too long or complicated. His response to a written command was as follows: The written request was " Undo the second button of your jacket, and do it up again ". He read this to himself slowly and with a puzzled expression, and after sixty seconds began to fumble with his buttons, eventually holding the appropriate one but getting no further. He then said: " I rather This response shows very well many of the factors which contribute to the mental disorder. There is first of all the slowness of perception and the inability to synthesize perceptions, to see the picture as a whole. Then there is the incapacity for precise figure formation and the perseveration.
The sequence of thoughts here, I suggest, was as follows: The word " second" brought out of the background the other members of a series-top, bottom. and so on. Hence the tendency to read " bottom " for button, a tendency increased by the clang association. On a subsequent reading the word " button " became clear. The word " bottom ", however, having intruded into the picture, persisted. Furthermore, as the patient held the paper, he thought of himself in the first person and myself in the second person. Hence, in the final thought there were two unprecise or blurred figure formations, the one containing " second " and " bottom ", the other " your " and " my ". Doubt now gave an interrogative direction to the thought process, two questions being formulated in his mind: " Do you mean second button or bottom button ? " and " Do you meah your jacket or my jacket ? " The first question was correctly solved. Before he spoke he had taken hold of the second button, and as he spoke he held it. It was the second question, therefore, which he now wished to propound: " Do you mean your jacket or my jacket, your button or my button ? " But perseveration of material belonging to the first question interfered with the proposition of the second. Hence its final form. Thus what appeared as a dyslexia was a representation at one point of the total mental disorder, and throws some light upon the basic confusion of thought which characterizes this state.
Shortly after this the patient began to improve. Seen on the 183rd day he appeared normal. He was able to retain seven digits, made no mistake in the name, address, and flower test, after five minutes, and showed good judgment. There was no longer any trace of dysphasia. He has now been back at his work for two years and, from my own observation and the reports of his friends and business associates, his cerebral function appears to be unimpaired.
Comprehension of the written command seems generally to return later than that for the spoken command. This difference is probably due to the fact that the written sentence is less easily perceived as a whole than the spoken sentence. As another example of the defect, I quote from Case II:
Given the written command in block capitals: ' Take your glasses off and give them to me ", he read it through to himself slowly and performed the action correctly. The next day the request was repeated, being written in script in the following form: " Take off your glasses and hand them to me." This he readto himself and then aloud, but substituted the word "gloves " for "glasses ", looked at his hands and said: " But I haven't got any." I then erased the word "glasses " in script and replaced it in block capitals. Again he looked at his hands and said 'forcibly: " I haven't got any." I then underlined the word glasses and exhlorteid him to try, again. This time he read aloud: " Take off your gloves and glasses and hand them to me ", took off his glasses and put them on the table.
Here, again, we note the slowness of perception and the difficulty in perceiving the sentence as a unit or even the unitary significance of certain words. As a result of the first reading of the sentence with imperfect comprehension, the word " hand " was introduced into the material for figure formation. Hence, on the second reading, the tendency to substitute " gloves " for " glasses ". We see also the perseveration of the word "gloves " even when the sentence was eventually understood.
The transition from the stage of confusion to that of the Korsakow state is a gradual one. There is a tendency always for the patient, even when he is confused, to confabulate when pressed for information. This tendency often persists at a time when his behaviour in relation to the hospital surroundings and his speech in simple conversation no longer show confusion. There remains, however, gross defect of memory, especially for the most recent events, imperfect orientation, and impaired insight and judgment. The confabulation may, as Russell has pointed out, lead to false accusations in relation to the accident, as in the following note made by Mr. D. W. C. Northfield in Case I.
The patient on the 45th day after injury showed very fair contact with his surroundings, was correctly oriented as to place and person, and only four days out in the date. He was then asked to give an account of his accident. The facts were that he had been found on the road unconscious, with his car overturned, near Leominster: was taken to the hospital there, and removed while still in a state of stupor to the London Hospital.
"Where were you when you had the accident? " "Hereford. Just outside Hereford, and this mnotorist, thinking I was someone he knew, overtook me and drove me into the hedge. Fortunately, being an experienced driver, I was able to stand on the brakes and get clear of the man. I went into Hereford and reported the matter to the police, feeling frightfully groggy. I heard the day later that the motorist and the pedestrian after him were prosecuted; one got ten years . no ten weeks and the other fined £25, so they must have been well known by the police. I only had thanks from the police." "What did you do after that ?" "Oh, I went to bed. It was about 8.30 p.m. and on the following morning I felt I couldn't get up and rang through for medical aid. A doctor carne and said I wasn't to get up. I was down there for a fortnight and then came here. Then I thought of this place as it was the only hospital I had previously been in. It has a great reputation for efficiency, and I'm very glad I came."
"Do you remember all about the accident ?" "Yes, pretty well. I remember hitn hitting across me and standing on the brakes. As a matter of fact I made a fool of the fellow. I had a new car and could do plenty of things with it that you couldn't do with an old car, and I just left him to it. Anyone who is in the retail motor trade and cannot drive a car wants to be looked at badly. On the trade side it is quite different. Fellow doesn't get the opportunities. MIay be able to drive quite well but is a foolish driver."
"Which hospital were you in at Hereford ? "Hereford Hospital, Bridgemount Road." "You had a clear recollection of going to hospital ?" " Oh yes. I did that to cover myself. That was within five minutes of the accident and they were very glad I came along. After that I seem to have been a bit barmy in some ways. I was there ten days and have no recollection of being there whatsoever, and I put it down to the fact that I was smashed in the head and was foolish. I don't remember the Sister in the ward whom my wife tells me saw a lot of us."
The Korsakow state, according to Pfeiffer, is a constant feature of the later stage of every prolonged traumatic psychosis. This, I think, is true in the sense that there is a stage in which gross defect of memory for recent events remains, sometimes for a long period, the outstanding symptom. But these patients do not always confabulate. When pressed for information they sometimes react in a helpless, bewildered, or irritable manner. The associated mood and individual make-up are factors Which are of importance in this connexion. The patient who is elated, and of an easy-going talkative disposition, confabulates readily.
The mood is, in fact, often elated in this phase, and spontaneous talk is plentifuloften boastful, in a childish way-as in the case from which I have just quoted. Actually, this patient after recovery proved to be a pleasant, easy-going personality, outspoken but not boastful or aggressive. Sometimes the mood throughout the whole psychosis is indifferent, sometimes there is a rather childish petulant depression. Elation however is the commonest abnormality.
The ending of the Korsakow stage is by no means clean-cut-one would not expect it to be so. After the tendency to confabulate has disappeared, there is usually a period during which euphoria persists, with defective insight and judgment, and with a variable but sometime gross defect of retention. Noticeable is the patient's refusal at this stage to admit that there is anything wrong with him and the lighthearted way in which he may refer to the accident, even though it may have involved the death of a relative or friend. The return of insight is an important landmark and may be taken to mean that the acute traumatic psychosis is at an end. For instance, a man whom I had seen on several occasions in the later stages of recovery had on each occasion declared himself thoroughly fit though showing evidence of slight confusion. Three months after the injury in answer to my question he replied: " I feel thoroughly fit, but I realize now that when I last saw you I wasn't fit, or in a condition to judge of my fitness. Therefore I may be not quite a good judge now."
The prognosis for the acute traumatic psychosis, including the phases of stupor, confusion, and confabulation, appears to be good whatever its duration. The longest record I have is that of Case II, in which the patient, a man aged 67, still showed some confusion and grossly defective memory fourteen months after his accident, but in a month from that time was quite clear and, though showing a slight residual deterioration of intellect and personality, has since (during the past year) managed his own affairs and led a normal life.
It appears then that the pathological changes, whatever they may be, which are responsible for the whole sequence of mental disorder which has so far been described, are reversible, at any rate to the point of allowing restoration of function under normal conditions. There remains the amnesia, which is always complete for a variable period before the accident, and for the whole period of stupor and confusion, and is patchy for the terminal or Korsakow stage. These cases of severe injury provide, as it were, a slow-motion picture of the mental disorder which follows minor injuries. In these we may see the phases of stupor, confusion, and amnestic-automatism pass in such rapid succession that the whole sequence is over in a matter of minutes. In the least severe injuries the symptoms of the earlier stages may be absent. A blow on the head may be followed immediately by automatism, without any preliminary stupor or confusion.
Many patients having recovered from the acute traumatic psychosis show residual defects-impaired memory and judgment, alteration of personality, and so on, which are very slow to recover, and remain in some cases and in some degree permanent. The striking fact, however, is that there is no absolute correlation between the duration or degree of the traumatic psychosis and the severity of these after-effects, which I am going to call the symptoms of post-traumatic dementia. The symptoms following a traumatic amnesia of twenty-four hours, for instance, may be more severe and longer lasting than those after a traumatic amnesia of a month's duration. This discrepancy is in some cases so striking as to suggest that we may be dealing with two separate pathologies, that the traumatic psychosis may be symptomatic of some diffuse reversible molecular damage, and that the symptoms of post-traumatic dementia may be due to coarse lesions, scattered haomorrhages, or areas of softening which are slow to resolve and may to some extent be irreparable.
Case III, to which I have already referred, affords a striking illustration of the absence of any symptoms of dementia when the patient was examined only a fortnight after the termination of an acute traumatic psychosis of six months' duration.
The following case provides an example of post-traumatic dementia in a simple settingo The patient, a cavalry officer, aged 40, on leave from Egypt, was found unconscious after a bunting accident on November 20, 1935. I saw him first on the 18th day after the injury when he exhibited a typical picture of traumatic confusion. From this he recovered with a traumatic amnesia of one month. Six weeks after the accident he returned home and was regarded by his relatives as normal, though his wife found him irritable. Three months after the injury, without taking any further medical advice, he returned to Egypt. Three months after this, however, his commanding officer wrote to the patient's wife stating that he had persuaded him to return home on leave as he was not fit for his work. I saw him then, for the second time, just seven months after the accident. His attitude was surly. He had been brought to see me by his wife against his will and knew nothing of his colonel's letter to her. He admnitted that his work had been difficult. Formal tests showed that he could retain only six digits. Over the 100 minus 7 test he took 35 seconds with one error. I obtained his permission to write to his colonel for a report. The reply was as follows:-" X was always a bit of a moaner, but since his injury he has been much worse. My officers who have been down to visit the detachments all said that he never stopped moaning, morning, noon and night.... When I first saw him he was quite impossible, would see no side of any question but his own, and was at loggerheads with the fortress commanders and staff, but he is already much better in that way. As I look at it he is a very capable and efficient officer. He is entering on another period of staff employmient, and he can't afford to fall down on it as he will never get in again. . . . Is he fit to hold down this job or will it be better for his future career to let it go and wait a bit ? . . . I must admit that three months ago I should have been prepared to bet that he wouldn't have lasted a month. Now I am almost persuaded that he will be O.K." I saw him next eight and a half months after the accident. In the meantime he had been resting and playing golf. He was now courteous and amiable. Over the 100 minus 7 test he took 30 seconds with one error. He still retained only six digits. Fourteen months after the accident he performed the 100 minus 7 test in 20 seconds with one error, retained seven digits without difficulty, and reported fit for duty.
In the state of post-traumatic dementia the symptoms show a great variety, depending upon such factors as age, constitution, individual experience and environmental stress. This is in contrast with the acute traumatic psychosis in which the fundamental symptomatology shows little variation. Age is an impoithtn factor in -the symptomatology of post-traumatic dementia at either extreme. In children the most prominent symptom is often behaviour disorder associated with defective moral sense. The clinical picture closely resembles that seen after encephalitis lethargica and has been well described by Strecker and Ebaugh, Beekman, and Blau. At the other extreme, impairment of the intellectual functions is usually more severe in patients over the age of 45. Constitution is perhaps the most important factor of all. There is a special liability for individuals of manic depressive stock to an attack of this kind of illness precipitated by the injury. To this I shall refer later. Apart from this, pre-existing traits in the mood and personality tend to become exaggerated-as illustrated in the case of the cavalry officer which I have reported. Tough-minded individuals may suffer little on the side of mood or personality, tender-minded persons severely. Individual experience also plays its part. The rider-to-hounds takes concussion as an accustomed risk; the clerk is shattered by the unusual experience. Environmental stress also is important. Under any stress which is too much for them, these patients tend to become sleepless, anxious, and irritable, especially if they are constitutionally of a sensitive disposition. The cumulative stress of a compensation situation is especially likely to bring out such symptoms.
The tendency in all cases of post-traumatic dementia is towards recovery. Although this is sometimes incomplete, residual disability from mental disorder directly due to head injury is, I believe, extremely rare apart from coarse lesions causing dysphasia (Bonner and Taylor). I have notes only of two cases in which post-traumatic dementia has resulted in permanent disability in an adult. One was that of a man who sustained two severe injuries within the space of two and a half years. On the first occasion he was struck on the head, by a burglar, with an iron bar, with a traumatic amnesia of three weeks. He insisted on going back to his work within six weeks of the injury, but for a year was under my care with mild symptoms of post-traumatic dementia. From these he appeared to make a complete recovery, but two and a half years after the original injury he was involved in a motor-car accident and had a traumatic amnesia of two weeks. Following this, he showed a severe post-traumatic defect in the intellectual sphere. He made several attempts to get back to his work as a commercial traveller but failed, owing to his defects of grasp and memory. He became more and more depressed over his failures and, although he was awarded full compensation, he entered into a state of hypochondriacal depression and has remained a permanent invalid.
The other was a pilot in the R.A.F., who at the age of 29 had a crash, followed by an amnesia of twenty-eight days. He had subsequently made an apparent recovery and was given a ground job, but was continually getting into trouble owing to his defective memory and was eventually, after two years' trial, invalided on this account. There were two significant points in his story. He had had a previous crash at the age of 24, with a three-day amnesia afterwards, and he had a persistent retrograde amnesia for a week before the second accident. This last point I cannot discuss fully now. My impression, however, is that a persistently long retrograde amnesia is always indicative of serious damage. The common factor in these two cases is the history of a previous injury of considerable severity. In each case functional recovery from the first injury appeared to be complete. There may, however, have been some permanent alteration of structure, and consequently less capacity for recovery after a second injury.
In children the altered disposition and behaviour disorder may persist into adult life.
All the most comprehensive studies of mental disorder following head injury have included some reference to the role played by such injury in precipitating mental illness of specific type-schizophrenia, paranoia, or manic-depressive psychosis.
There are clearly two ways in which the effects of the injury may contribute towards such a development.
In the first place, as we have already observed, one of the symptoms in the state of post-traumatic dementia is an exaggeration of pre-existing traits in the mood and personality. In the second place, the injury creates a situation of invalidism and incapacity to which the patient reacts in terms of his individual make-up. These two factors, acting together, provide an opportunity for the development of schizoid, paranoid, or depressive states in individuals of corresponding disposition. Many examples of this kind are to be found in the literature, notably those recorded by Meyer and Schilder. Illness of the manic-depressive type, however, in its major or minor degrees, may develop, in a way which suggests very strongly that it is a direct result of the organic disturbance. Schilder expresses himself clearly upon this important point; he says that " The head injury in these cases does not act merely as a psychic trauma, but has an organic consequence for the elaboration of the psychosis."
The most convincing evidence is to be obtained from cases in which symptoms of the manic-depressive type appear before the patient has recovered from the acute traumatic psychosis, that is to say while he is still confused, and without any appreciation of the effects of his injury. I have encountered two examples of this.
(1) The first was in a man, aged 34, whose brother had an illness called neurastnenia after the Great War, and had ultimately recovered. He himself had always been a worrier and, three years before his accident, under mild stress passed through a phase of depression, with indecision and ideas of reference. In November 1934 he suffered a severe head injury followed by deep stupor, lasting three days, and subsequent confusion. While still in hospital, a month after his injury, he became depressed, thought he had cancer, and blamed himself for having given his wife their last child. Subsequently, he believed he was wanted by the police. He remained in a state of restless hypochondriacal depression. I saw him nine months after the injury in a mental hospital when he was still depressed, selfreproachful, with somewhat bizarre ideas of self-accusation, and hearing accusatory voices. He is reported to be in much the same state now, two and a half years after the injury.
(2) The second case was that of a woman, aged 49, who gave a normal family history.
At the age of 22, following a broken engagement and her mother's death, she passed into a state of depression lasting several weeks, during which she was incapacitated. Else she was reported to have been active, cheerful, and capable. In August 1936 she was knocked down by a motor-cycle and had a traumatic amnesia of one week. As soon as she began to be capable of coherent conversation she begged to be taken out of hospital because she had been such a trouble to the doctors and nurses. She had heard from the other patients that in her confusion she had been difficult and this preyed upon her mind. On returning home she continued to be depressed and self-reproachful, blaming herself for her inability to sustain her domestic responsibilities. When seen, three and a half months after the accident, she was in a state of restless depression, self-reproachful and helpless. I cannot leave this subject without some reference to traumatic neurasthenia following head injury. Why is traumatic neurasthenia, so called, more commonly encountered after head injuries than after injuries to other parts of the body ? I suggest, as an answer, that the patients so labelled after head injury fall into three groups:
(1) The group in which the situation arising out of the accident (including the compensation situation) leads to the development of hysterical or anxiety states.
These are no more frequent after head injury than injury elsewhere.
(2) The group of patients who are really suffering from post-traumatic dementia. These patients are apt to react with anxiety and irritability to tasks which are beyond their capacity.
(3) The group of patients whose constitution before the accident has been of the depressive or anxious type. In this group the injury to the brain precipitates or releases an illness, which, once begun, runs its own course-usually towards complete recovery. These patients may genuinely be regarded as suffering from neurasthenia which is traumatic in a physical, rather than a psychogenic, sense.
In this brief review of a large subject I have confined myself to the common clinical effects of head injury. I have said nothing about their pathology and treatment, for I have expressed my views on these subjects elsewhere (Symonds, 1932 (Symonds, , 1935 (Symonds, , 1936 .
There are, however, one or two points about the pathology of the acute traumatic psychosis which I may be allowed to make clear. There have been attempts to explain this in terms either of increased intracranial pressure or subarachnoid haemorrhage. The observation of a clear, colourless spinal fluid, with a pressure of 135 mm. of water in Case III offers an example of what may be found, often enough, to discredit both these theories. I have no alternative to offer save the rather vague conception of direct molecular damage.
In conclusion there is one generalization in which I should like to indulge, however trite it may seem. The later effects of head injury can only be properly understood in the light of a full psychiatric study of the individual patient, and in particular, his constitution. In other words, it is not only the kind of injury that matters, but tfhp hind nf head. RE FERENCES B3EEKMAN (1928) , Ann. Sury., 87, 355. I3LAU (1936 ), Arch. Neurol. and Psychiat., 35, 723. I3ONNER and TAYLOR (1936 ), Am. J. Psychiat., 92, 763. (GOLDSTEIN (1936 ), Psychiatric Quarterly, 10, 586. MEYER (1904 , Am. J. Inisan., 60, 374. PFEIFFER (1928) , Bandb. des Geisteskrankheiten. BuIm1ke. Berlini, Springer, 3, 415. RuSSELL (1935) , Lancet (ii), 762. SCHILDER (1934 ), Am. J. Psychiat., 41, 129. STRECKER and EBAUGH (1924 ), Arch. Nentrol. antd Psychiat., 12, 443. SYMIONDS (1932 (1935), ibid. (i), 486; (1936) , ibid. (i), 854.
D)ISCUSSION
The PRESIDENT said he understood Dr. Symonds to have stated that amenesia for the period of confusion was complete even in minor cases. He himself had had a slight concussion, through falling off a horse, followed by confusion lasting about an hour. He had several apparently consecutive, but inconsequent, memories which must have gone back to a period very soon after the accident. He remembered seeing the front feet of a horsewhich suggested that he was still lying down when he saw them. He then remembered sitting up and seeing a familiar landscape which he yet could not identify. Then he saw a straw stack and hated its colour; then he walked with a young man to whom he was extremely polite. All these phenomena had a dream-like quality. All were subsequently verified, but what he never remlembered was that he had in fact used a great deal of bad language and been in reality far from polite. The memories were therefore selective. What mnight have been embarrassing to remember had been repressed. These " forgettings" did not seem to be accidental, but to depend on the ordinary laws governing repression.
Dr. THOS. TENNENT: The frequency of psychoses resulting from head injuries is generally agreed to be rare. The present study is based on 44 patients admitted to the Maudsley Hospital during the years from 1923 until 1936. I have tlle imnpression that these forms of mental illness are less rare than formerly described, and it is noteworthy that whereas during the eleven years, from 1923 until 1933, only 26 cases were admitted, during the three years, from 1934 until 1936, 18 such cases have been treated in hospital. In each of these the patient was suffering from a severe psychosis following upon an injury to the head, necessitating in each case a stay in hospital of from two to over twelve months.
Four proved to be cases of general paralysis and will not be considered further in this paper. Of the remainder, the initial symptoms were mnore or less the same in all, namely, confusion, varying degrees of irritability and depression, disorientation and gross memory disturbances. The clinical picture was therefore the same as that so clearly described by Dr. Symonds.
In five cases, when the degree of confusion became less marked, hallucinatory experiences and bizarre or paranoid delusional ideas became prominent. A study of the previous personality showed that each of these was reserved, seclusive, and definitely schizoid. There was evidence that two of these patients had had previous hallucinatory experiences. None of these have shown any permanent clinical improvement and four have remained in mental hospitals.
In five others the form of the illness became depressive in nature; in three of these there was a history of treatment for a similar depressive illness some years previously. Two others developed a manic reaction, part of a manic-depressive psychosis. The present state of health of these seven patients is that four have recovered from their psychosis, two are still in mental hospitals and one is dead.
Three casec occulrred iXn children under 16 years of age. In one of these the clinical form was that of depressilon. The boy had been treated two years previously at the hospital *during a manic phase. The ;fdrm in the other two children was that of moral change. Before the accident each had been well behaved, afterwards they showed marked irritability, temper outburst, stealing, 'and general intellectual deterioration. One of these has since becn admitted ito an institution as a moral defective; the other, according to the parents, has shown a partial improvement but remaiins a problem.
There remain in the series 25 patients in whom the form of illness was attributable solely to the accident. That form has been described already. In all of these patients there was marked impairment of memory. In six this was of the Korsakow type. One described vividly how Napoleon had marshalled his army the night previously, so that he, the patient, migh,t address the men. Tw9, who saw active service during the war, showed an interesting ante-dating; they maintained that the war was still on and readily furnished details of their activities. All patients in this group improved and were discharged home. At the time of d4ischarge 15 were described as "recovered"; nine as " improved ". It has been possible to trace all these patients and to obtain details as to their present condition.
Of 15 discharged "recovered ", 11 have maintained this state of health; two show a partial improvement-they are still employable-and two have died. Of nine " improved" at the time of discharge, seven continue in this group and two are in' mental hospitals. The present state of the 25 patients in this group then, is that 11 have recovered, nine have improved, three are in mental hospitals and two are dead.
Those in the " recovered " group appear well and have no symptoms. They have required ,no further medical care and are able to retain employment.
Those in the " improved " group have residual sylnptoms. The chief of these are pains -in the head, irritability, lack of power of concentration, and inability to make a decision. This inability to make a decision was quoted in practically all these cases; insight appeared to be retained, with consequent irritability on the part of the patient. Four of these patients are able to retain employnepit but this must be of a simple routine nature. The others are unemployable; two have developed epileptiforin seizures. As might be anticipated, the presence of arteriosclerotic factors made the outlook less favourable.
These findings support the view that the prognosis for the acute psychotic symptoms is invariably good; all of these patients were discharged home. Dr. Symonds has said that permanent residual defect occurs in some cases but that this rarely amounts to disability. This is not confirmed in this series. In no less than 36% were residual symptoms found and they were of such a degree as to interfere with the patient's health and ability to earn a livelihood.
Dr. E. GUTTMANN: In co-operation with E. Winterstein I am carrying out examinations -of boxers, because the " knock-out" seems to be a sort of experimental paradigm for the study of traumatic injury in general or at least of its mildest and transient forms. In order to bring some psychiatric system into the mental disorder after head injury, I adopt Jaspers' classification of the disturbances of consciousness into simple dimming, delirious clouding, and change of consciousness (as in twilight states). The disturbances observed after uncomplicated knock-outs belong to the first group, that is to say, they all show simple states between consciousness and unconsciousness and they do not show delirious features. One boxer who had a twilight state after having been knocked out, developed disseminated sclerosis later on and may have been ill already. There is sufficient reason to suppose that the transient disturbance of consciousness through knock-out is a functional one, i.e. not due to a structural brain damage. Therefore these observations seem to me a negative argument in favour of the hypothesis (brought forward by others) that a post-concussional delirium is in itself suggestive of an organic lesion of the brain. The high frequency of residual symptoms in Dr. Tennent's cases supports this opinion, since one may expect that a more detailed after-examination would have increased the number of cases with residual symptoms even beyond Dr. Tennent's 36%. Two of Dr. Symonds' cases may be interpreted in the same way, namely the two in which the patients recovered fully after simple concussion but remained damaged after a post-traumatic psychosis.
The self-observations of boxers are an interesting material with regard to the question whether the gap in the memory is a convenient measure for the duration of unconsciousness. We can time the onset of unconsciousness and we learn afterwards from our subjects how nuch the period between the onset of amnesia and the actual trauma varies in different JULY-PSYCH. 2 * individuals. Some persons say that they felt the blow and eveni felt certain sensations afterwards; others saw the-blow coming but did not feel it; others do noti remenmber the whiole round, the whole preceding fight, &c. Thus the retrograde amnesia enlarges the gap of memory beyond the period of unconsciousness. There may be several injuries and jeveral retrograde amnesie, as Dr. Mapother pointed out, or there may be a subsequent confusion which shouild be differentiated in term and matter from unconsciousness, although both leave behihnd an amnesia a;s Dr. Tennent's cases have shown.
Dr. PURDON MARTIN said that he had been accustomed to group the symuptoms and cases more than Dr. Symonds had done. There were (1) the amnesias associated with simple concussion, (2) irritative or hypomanic states which led on to a condition of confusion, disorientation, perseveration, &c., often accompanied by elation and lasting several months. These usually resulted from more severe head injuries with prolonged unconsciousness. Dr. Symonds had rejected the theory that this sequence of symptoms resulted from traumatic subarachnoid hmemorrhage, but he (Dr. Martin) still preserved an open mind on that point. He had, like Dr. Symonds, encountered cases in which the cerebrospinal fluid was clear, but unfortunately they did not often see these cases until a considerable time after the accident. In his cases in which the cerebrospinal fluid had been examined within a day or two of the accident some blood had always been present and he had never seen a case with these major mental symptoms in which cerebrospinal fluid had been normal. Examined weeks after the accident, it showed an increase in protein.
(3) Thirdly, there were the late dementias. He agreed with Dr. Symonds that the prognosis in cases of post-traumatic psychosis was almost invariably good, but he had seen two or three cases in which, about a year after the accident, when a great degree of recovery had occurred, the patients had relapsed and progressively deteriorated. In one instance, the patient, a railwayman, had become well enough to go back to partial work for a time before relapsing. (4) The fourth group was formed by " traumatic neurasthenia ", and he was grateful to Dr. Symonds for his analysis of this group. He strongly supported the view that some cases classed as traumatic neurasthenia were really mild cases of traumatic psychosis or dementia and had some organic basis.
He wished to make particular reference to the symptom of elation. He believed that it had some localizing significance and indicated an injury of a frontal lobe. It was related to "Witzelsucht ". It wasnow beginning to be seen as a result of operations involving removal (or partial removal) of a frontal lobe. In his experience, when it occurred after a head injury it persisted throughout the patient's illness and one of its effects was to prevent the occurrence of an anxiety state.
